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The widespread resort to scal stimulus at the onset of the global crisis and, more re-
cently, the emerging need to consolidate decits in response to rising scal imbalances,
have revitalized the debate on the transmission of scal policy|\the multiplier". As
this is typically estimated by tracing the eects on economic activity of exogenous
scal impulses, much of the debate has focused on identifying innovations to spending
or taxation, distinct from variations that are systematically related to the business
cycle. Failure to draw a sharp distinction in this dimension means that reverse cau-
sation, from output to spending and taxes, and anticipation eects may spuriously
raise (or lower) estimated multipliers (see e.g. Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Barro and
Redlick 2011 and Ramey 2011). However, even when truly exogenous scal shocks
can be accurately identied, the response of private expenditure can be expected to
vary across economic and policy environments. Specically, it is bound to depend
not only on the rate of unemployment and the state of the nancial system, but also,
and especially so, on the overall policy mix|e.g. multipliers are higher when policy
rate is at the zero lower bound, or budget consolidation is expected to take place via
spending cuts (see e.g. Christiano et al. 2011, Corsetti et al. 2012, Leeper et al.
2009, Romer and Romer 2010 and Woodford 2011 among others). The literature has
indeed become increasingly aware of the fact that no single estimate can be expected
to be a good guide to policymaking in all circumstances.
In this paper, we address both dimensions of empirical analyses of the multiplier by
relying on a quasi-experiment setting that enables us, rst, to identify temporary but
sizeable variation in public spending that are exogenous to the cyclical conditions of
the economy and, second, to analyze their transmission controlling for monetary and
budget policy. Specically, we estimate the output multiplier of public investment
at provincial level in Italy. We instrument spending by exploiting an Italian law
which, on evidence of maa inltration in a city council, mandates the dismissal
of the elected ocials. The instrument builds on the fact that the crime evidence
leading to dismissals emerges quite randomly in the course of police investigation,
and dismissals may translate into an immediate suspension of payments into public
investment projects. In our sample, indeed, the average growth rate of spending at
provincial level during episodes of compulsory administration turns negative, with
an average drop of 20 percentage points. Overall, city council dismissals result in
unexpected, large contraction in spending, exogenous to local cyclical uctuations in
economic activity.
To control for policy determinants of the equilibrium multiplier (other than spend-
ing), our study also benets, rst, from a specic characteristic of scal federalism
in Italy during the 1990s, by which local public expenditure (including public works)
2causes little or no variation at all in the tax burden faced by the residents in a province,
since it is nanced through tax revenue raised centrally by the government. Second,
it benets from a standard advantage of analyses based on local data, consisting in
the ability to control for monetary and scal policy at national level by means of
time dummies. Relative to the literature, therefore, our quasi-experimental setting
is uniquely suited to assess the output eects of changes in spending, controlling for
both prospective tax adjustment and monetary policy.
In our ndings, spending contractions that are not compensated by monetary
expansions, holding the tax burden constant, have a multiplicative eect on output
as high as 1:2. Furthermore, under the maintained hypothesis that lagged spending is
exogenous to contemporaneous value added, the combined eects of current and past
spending bring our estimate of the overall multiplier to around 1:8. In our preferred
model specication, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the multiplier is
less than, or equal to, one at standard condence levels.
Fundamental insights on the transmission mechanism underlying our results are
provided by theoretical models focusing on economies that, akin to the Italian provinces
in our sample, are small and face an exogenously given monetary policy, either because
they pursue a xed exchange rate, or because they are part of a currency union. As
emphasized by recent analysis of new-Keynesian open-economy models (see Corsetti
et al. 2011), in economies with these features, not only the nominal policy rate is un-
responsive to local conditions. Also, purchasing power parity (holding in the medium
to the long run) constraints the dynamics of local prices, so that any short-run con-
tractionary eects of a scal cut is undone over time, as prices realign to the level
prevailing outside the local area. Anticipations of this price dynamics limit the im-
pact response of real interest rates to negative government spending shocks, and thus
result in little or no crowding-in of private demand: output tends to move one-to-one
with local government spending.
Most importantly, the same literature also stresses that the scal-monetary mix in
a common currency interacts quite signicantly with other channels of transmission,
also relevant in our study. A key instance is the presence of nancial frictions and
imperfections, which may result in a limited participation of private agents in nancial
markets. In the model analyzed by Corsetti et al. (2011), assuming that one third of
domestic households are \spenders" as dened in Mankiw (1999) brings the impact
multiplier to 1.3, but only under a common monetary policy (with an independent
monetary policy, the multiplier is below one).1
Yet our contribution goes beyond the debate of scal transmission in a common
1As discussed in Section 7, another promising theoretical avenue extensively explored by the
literature to reconcile the theory with the data, consists of assuming preferences consistent with
complementarity between consumption and employment
3currency area (or in countries with a xed exchange rate). As already mentioned,
our empirical study also isolates the short-run impact of spending controlling for tax
adjustment. Failure to control for current and anticipated budget adjustment would
imply that estimated multipliers average out the eects of dierent policy inputs,
whose relative intensity may vary across circumstances (a point stressed by Romer
and Romer 2010 among others).
Together with the present study a number of recent works have delved into the
analysis of multiplier eects using sub-national data. Looking at state-level relative to
national military spending in the US, Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) estimate multi-
pliers in the range 1:4-1:9 (based on biannual data). Other studies rely on exogenous
sources of variation in spending other than military, adopting a quasi-experiment set-
ting. Serrato and Wingender (2010) use fund reallocation across U.S. counties, due
to changes in the methodology underlying estimates of local populations, while Shoag
(2010) exploits the idiosyncratic component of the returns on dened-benet pension
plans managed by US states. In these two studies, multipliers are statistically dierent
from zero, and as high as 1:88 and 2:12; in the respective baseline specication. Mul-
tipliers are nonetheless found to be not signicantly dierent from zero by Clemens
and Miran (2010), who build on dierences in the balanced-budget requirements at
state level.2 Relative to this literature, our contribution has two novel and distinct
features. First, our analysis disentangle impact and dynamics eects of the multi-
plier. Second, although our regression model does not explicitly allow for asymmetric
eects of spending expansions and cuts, our estimates of the multiplier mainly rely on
sharp scal contractions|as opposed to redistributive shocks, or changes in military
spending. Also in this dimension, analyses that average out the eects of expansions
and contractions may overlook systematic asymmetries in the transmission channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical
model. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of our instrument, starting with some
institutional details on the laws targeting maa connections. In section 4 we discuss
our main results. Section 5 provides evidence that our measure of the multiplier is not
contaminated by transmission channels unrelated to variation in spending. Section 6
draws further lessons from varying the specication of the empirical model. Section
2Cohen et al. (2010), who instrument public spending with changes in congressional commit-
tee chairmanship, note that spending variations appear to signicantly dampen corporate sector
investment and employment activity. As suggested by the authors, their results may however re-
ect a high level of employment over the sample under consideration. Fishback and Kachanovskaya
(2010) exploit a swing voting measure, which varies primarily across states, as an instrument for
government grants during the New Deal. In their results, estimates of the multiplier are strongly
sensitive to model specication and the denition of the spending variable|some are not statistically
dierent from zero; the point estimate of the multiplier for public works grant is as high as 1:67.
The multiplier is found to be insignicantly dierent from zero by Kraay (2012), who focus on a
panel of low-income countries for which World Bank lending is an important source of nancing of
government expenditures.
47 selectively reviews the theoretical literature on the multiplier, to draw insights on
the transmission mechanism. Section 8 concludes.
2 The empirical model
In our study, we aim at recovering the short-run multiplicative eects on output of
infrastructure investment spending at the provincial level in Italy. In this section, we
present the regression model. In the next section, we discuss our instrument.
To carry out the study, we have assembled a dataset at the provincial level in Italy.
The Italian province is a geographic entity similar to a U.S. county, and contains
several municipalities. Reecting a constraint on the availability of comparable data,
our sample covers the whole country over the ten-year span between 1990 and 1999.3
During this period, there were 95 provinces in Italy; hence, we have 950 observations.
For each province, let yi denote the real per-capita value added, and Yi;t its rate
of growth, dened as Yi;t =
yi;t yi;t 1
yi;t 1 ; similarly, let gi denote the real per-capita
infrastructure investment, and Gi;t its year-on-year change as a ratio of lagged value
added, Gi;t =
gi;t gi;t 1
yi;t 1 . In line with recent literature (see e.g. Barro and Redlick
2011), we estimate spending multiplier relating the growth of per-capita value added
in province Yi;t to the year-on-year change in per-capita spending on infrastructure
in the same province Gi;t. The empirical model is
Yi;t = Gi;t + i + t + Xi;t + vi;t; (1)
where the coecient  measures the contemporaneous one-year government spending
multiplier; i is a province xed eect, t is a year xed eect; X denotes exogenous
covariates, to be discussed below.
With the inclusion of year xed eect in equation (1) we control for national com-
ponents in public investment and GDP common to all provinces. Aggregate variations
in spending and output at national level are usually predictable and arguably endoge-
nous to cyclical developments, and hence a major concern in time series analysis, as
they may lead to spurious estimates of the multiplier due to reverse causation.4
Recent contributions have also claried that multipliers compound the eects of
scal shocks, with those of the mix of monetary and scal policy anticipated to prevail
over both short and long-term horizons (see e.g. Christiano et al. 2011; Corsetti et
3The Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) provides a consistent data series on public works at
province level from 1987 to 1999.
4In this respect, we should also note that focusing on the infrastructure investment component
of public spending already makes our spending measure less likely to be aected by current business
cycle considerations, compared to other spending components. Investment changes are often driven
by political factors reecting the beliefs of the party in power, and usually motivated in terms of
long-run goals.
5al. 2010, 2012; and Woodford 2011). Namely, the transmission of scal stimulus
or contraction is bound to be crucially aected by the monetary stance (reecting
the inationary stance of the central bank, but also constraints on monetary policy,
as implied e.g. by the zero lower bound), as well as by the anticipation of scal
measures (spending cuts or tax hikes) dictated by the need to stabilize public debt
in the medium and long run.5 In our contribution, the time-xed eect naturally
accounts also for policy measures with common eects throughout the country.
With the inclusion of province-xed eect, we address potential issues raised by the
possibility that province-specic characteristics be correlated with spending allocation
criteria. By way of example, it may be possible that central government systematically
allocates relatively large projects in lower-growth provinces, in an eort to spur local
economic activity. Under this allocation criterion, the OLS estimates of the multiplier
not controlling for between eect (and not instrumented) would tend to be spuriously
low.
An advantage specic to our data derives from the type of scal federalism in
place in Italy during our sample years, based on Law No. 281/1970 and Law No.
382/1975. On the spending side, these laws give the central government the power to
budget the overall ow of resources accruing to local governments and decentralized
public administrations. The latter in turn retain full control of these funds, including
the power to select public projects, and the rms to carry them out. On the revenue
side, however, local governments have very little power to set tax rates.6 Throughout
our sample years, then, by the institutions of the Italian scal federalism, the public
resources channelled by the central government into local investment projects are not
matched by variations in the tax burden of the local residents. We can therefore
abstract from potential issues arising from the omission of tax changes (or debt)
from the empirical model. Romer and Romer (2010), for instance, emphasize that
aggregate spending and tax changes may occasionally become strongly correlated|
typically reecting emerging political concerns with the ongoing government decit.
To the extent that tax changes have a negative impact on output|theses authors
argue|the omission of this variable induces a downward bias in the estimate of the
spending multiplier.7
As regards the matrix of controls, X, we include two proxies for unemployment, to
account for possible heterogeneity across provinces and macro areas. These proxies are
5By way of example, multiplier eects have been shown to be stronger if monetary policy is
accommodative, or current expansions are anticipated to cause spending to fall below trend in the
future (Corsetti et al. 2011, 2012).
6In our sample years, Italian municipalities were able to adjust, at the margin, the rate of two
taxes. The change in revenue could account however for a very little share of their overall budget.
7According to recent literature, the tax multipliers|relating output to marginal income-tax rates
or tax revenues, is found to be around  1 (see, for instance, Barro and Redlick 2011; Romer and
Romer 2010; and Mertens and Ravn 2010).
6given by the (t 1 and t 2 log-dierence of the) per-capita hours of Cassa Integrazione
Guadagni, the unemployment insurance scheme available to employees of large private
rms in Italy, and the rate of employment at provincial level. Unemployment rates
vary substantially across macro areas, with marked dierences between the North and
the South.
In addition, we include ve variables measuring the number of people reported to
the judicial authority for (i) maa-type association, (ii) extortion, (iii) maa-related
murders, (iv) corruption, as well as also (v) the number of corruption crimes8 reported
to the judicial authority|all dened in per-capita dierence terms, and entered in the
regression model both contemporaneously and lagged up to two years.9 As explained
below, since council dismissals tend to be associated with higher policy deterrence, it
may be possible that intense police investigation aects economic activity (legal and
illegal) at local level on top and above the eect of variation in public spending. The
set of ve variables just dened are included to control for these eects, under the
maintained assumption that the outcome of police investigation in terms of arrests
and people charged with crimes is increasing in deterrence.10
In some of our specications we further include lagged values of the number of
council dismissals (with the goal of improving the precision of our estimates), as well
as lags of our spending variable, Gi;t. In seminal contributions to the literature, es-
pecially (but not exclusively) to the SVAR literature, lags of Gi;t are assumed to be
pre-determined with respect to Yi;t, as a key maintained assumption to identify multi-
pliers. Under the same assumption, the coecient on the lags of Gi;t in our regressions
provides estimates of the dynamic multiplier, complementing our IV estimates.
Finally, as is well known, inference in panel estimation can be highly misleading
if there is correlation within groups of observations at any t, or serial correlation, or
both (see e.g. Bertrand et al. 2004, Angrist and Pischke 2009). Regarding the serial
correlation problem, in the absence of a clear consensus yet on the best strategy to
deal with it, we will use up to two lags of the dependent variable. Regarding the
spatial correlation problem, there is no obvious way in which the 95 Italian provinces
can be thought of as a cluster sample. As in Guiso et al. (2004), we will posit that
8Corruption crimes include embezzlement, misappropriation of yield to the damage of government,
extortion and bribery agreements. In general, the spatial distribution of such variables reects the
province where the crime is eectively committed.
9The categories (i) through (v) are taken from ocial statistics by ISTAT, in turn reecting the
classication of crimes in the Italian Law. The rst three categories strictly refer to maa crimes
(see \Codice di Procedura Penale art. 51, comma 3 bis."); article 416-bis of the Italian penal code
denes the crime of maa-type association. The last two are relative to corruption of public ocials.
We also control for people reported by the police forces to the judicial authority because of murders
related to the activity of maas. Maa murders are recorded by ISTAT according to information
supplied by the police force.
10Areas with a relatively heavy presence of the maa are likely to be characterized, on average,
by a relatively high number of mobsters arrested by the police. These cross-province dierences in
averages are however captured by the province xed eect.
7provinces belonging to the same region are correlated as a result of an unobserved
cluster eect due to common regional rules and policies. Our inference will therefore
be based on standard errors robust to contemporaneous spatial correlation allowing
for 190 clusters (10 yearly observation for 19 regions|whereas we aggregate the small
region of Valle D'Aosta with Piemonte).
3 Instrumenting Changes in Public Spending
Despite the advantages of our empirical model described above, an OLS estimation
of equation (1) would not shield our results from standard criticisms of the empirical
literature on multipliers. First, spending on infrastructures is usually planned some
years before it actually takes place. A failure to account for anticipation eects
over the time span between the announcement and the realization of projects can
substantially bias empirical results. Second, in our sample, the government may have
systematically allocated funds in response to local developments, in ways that are not
accounted for by province-xed eect. To address these problems, we need a good
instrument for unexpected variations in public spending exogenous to local economic
conditions.
3.1 The institutional setting: maa inltration and compul-
sory administration
To introduce our instrument, it is useful to start with some background information
on the way maa-related crimes are treated by the Italian law. In view of the rising
presence of organized crime in the Italian economy, in 1982 two articles were added
to the penal code, expressly targeting maa-type associations.11 Articles 416-bis and
416-ter emphasize the use of intimidation, associative ties and omert a (condition of
silence) as specic to maa, to acquire direct or indirect control of otherwise legal
economic activities, especially in the area of the provision of public services and
public investment. The two articles are meant to target maa-type associations, in
their activities aimed at inuencing the results of electoral competition and/or at
obtaining eective control over public tenders.12
Public works managed by local administrations in Italy are a particularly large
source of business for the maas. Its expansion was clearly favored by the distorted
11Historically, dierent maa-like groups have been active in dierent regions: the Camorra in
Campania, the 'Ndrangheta in Calabria, the Sacra Corona Unita (SCU) in Puglia, and the Maa
in Sicily. Each group consists of a number of maa associations, the most \famous" being the Cosa
Nostra in Sicily and, recently, the Casalesi in Campania.
12On the inuence of maas on the legal economy via their relations with public ocials, including
political representatives, judges, local administrators and members of the police force, see Acconcia
et al. (2009) and references within.
8incentives created by the scal federalism laws between 1970s and the end 1990s,
whereby local administrators were not responsible to nance their spending through
local taxes. Not surprisingly, local governments lobbied strongly for public funding
from the central government (Cassese 1977 and 1983)|their success being helped by
the fact that, historically, public investment has been used in Italy as a key policy
instrument to foster growth and sustain social cohesion.13 In addition, an important
role was also played by the strong earthquake that hit the south of Italy at the
end of 1980. With the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, a large inow
of government funds benetted areas of Italy traditionally under the control of the
maas.
Over our sample period, the size of prots accruing to organized crime from their
control of public works is estimated to be comparable to that of extortion and drug
dealing (see Ministro dell'Interno, 2000). Maa inltration has indeed created a vast
network interconnecting legal and illegal activities. According to the Commissione
Parlamentare di Inchiesta (2005) and the media, many of the rms suspected of
maa collusion are competitive nation-wide, i.e. they operate with high standards of
eciency also in geographical areas and input markets outside the maa-controlled
regions.
The rapid expansion of the phenomenon of maa inltration in city councils
throughout the 1980s is arguably a key motivation for introducing, in the early 1990s,
tougher anti-maa measures, including a law giving the central government the power
to remove elected ocials on evidence that their decisions be determined/controlled
by the maas (D.L. 31/05/1991 n. 164). According to this law, upon the removal of
a city council, the central government appoints three non-elected, external commis-
sioners, who rule the municipality for a period of 18 months. By 2011, the number
of city councils dismissed under the anti-maa law is 199. The Table 1, taken from
the website of the Italian Ministero dell'Interno, shows that dismissals are mostly
concentrated in the provinces of Naples, Palermo, Reggio Calabria, and Caserta.14
The geographical distribution of dismissals reects the dierent intensity in the
presence of the maa both within and across regions. Considering all types of maa
crimes together, there is a high concentration in some provinces of Sicily, Campania,
Calabria and Puglia, but the maas' presence is signicant also in Northern regions
like Piemonte and Lombardia.15 It is worth noting that dierences across provinces
13Especially after the 1980, investment in infrastructure and public spending in social security
became the two main area of policy intervention by the Italian government.
14The table refers to the 172 dismissals recorded by 2008.
15Using data for convictions on the crime of maa association as an indicator of relative intensity,
for instance, 90 per cent of the 5;443 mobsters convicted up to 2001, were put on trial by courts in
Southern regions|mainly Sicily, Campania, Calabria and Puglia. Yet, in the Campania region, only
239 mobsters were convicted in the judicial district of Salerno (corresponding to 24 convictions per
100;000 inhabitants), against 1483 in the district of Naples (32 convictions per 100;000 inhabitants).
9and regions are mostly driven by historical accidents and/or maas' own strategies and
pervasiveness|they can hardly be attributed to dierences in the rates of deterrence.
3.2 An instrument \one can't refuse"
When a local government is dismissed on evidence of maa inltration, the external
commissioners appointed by the central government has the power to suspend nancial
ows into local public works and investment projects with the goal of stemming
any direct or indirect nancing of the maa. Public works and projects are started
again after investigation of past tender procedures and decisions establishes that the
contractors are not eectively tied to the maa.
3.2.1 Compulsory administration and spending
Our sample comprises 110 cases of city councils put under compulsory administration
for maa inltration. Aggregating them by province, we obtain 47 observations. In
principle, the aggregation of municipality-level information at provincial level could
dilute the average changes in public investment due to compulsory administration of
single city councils. In practice, however, infrastructure investment projects typically
involve more than one municipality. Even when the city under compulsory adminis-
tration is small, the size of public investment aected by the freeze may end up being
large at the provincial level.
In Table 2, we report mean dierence tests for the changes in public infrastructure
investment across provinces. First, we divide the observations in our sample into two
groups: those relative to year-province after a municipality in the province is placed
under compulsory administration by the central government|the treatment group|,
and those in the rest of the sample|the control group. As shown in columns 1 and
3 of the table, against a positive mean change in investment spending for the con-
trol group, the dierence between the treatment group and the control group is large
and statistically signicant. It is actually so large that the mean change in invest-
ment in the provinces with municipalities placed under compulsory administration is
negative|the average contraction amounts to half a percentage point of provincial
value added.
Second, to make sure that the mean dierences in the table are not driven by
a systematic dierence in average spending growth between the treatment and the
control group, we re-dene these groups using exclusively the subsample of provinces
In the Calabria region, the number of convictions in Catanzaro and Reggio were, respectively, 204
and 343 (that is, 14 and 59 per 100;000 inhabitants); in the region of Puglia, the corresponding
number in Bari and Lecce is 142 and 534 (that is 6 and 30 per 100;000 inhabitants). In the North
many convictions were sentenced by courts in Piemonte and Lombardia.
10with at least one case of compulsory administration. The results, in columns 2 and 4
of the table, shows that this is not the case.
A graphical representation of the cuts is provided in Figure 1, aggregating data
for the provinces of Napoli, Reggio Calabria, Palermo, Catania, Bari, Salerno and
Avellino, all experiencing city council dismissal in the years 1991 through 1993. The
gure plots the average rate of change in spending over a window centered around
the year of the dismissal|marked by the vertical line over the 0 on the x-axis. The
contraction in spending is apparent, so is its swift recovery over time.
We observe that, in size, the change in infrastructure investment underlying our
estimates is comparable to the change in scal variables often studied in empirical
analysis of multipliers. As regards defense spending, changes in scal variables (in
percent of GDP) related to the Korean War are of the order of 0:5% in 1953 and
 2:1% in 1954. After 1954, the changes occurring during the Vietnam war are of
the order of  1:2% in 1966 and 1:1% in 1967 (see Barro and Redlick 2011). On the
revenue side, the eect of the 54 legislated exogenous tax changes identied by Romer
and Romer (2010) amounts to  0:03% of GDP.
3.2.2 Is the instrument variation systematically related to local economic
activity?
The procedure leading to a dismissal of a city council because of maa inltration
is typically started by the prefetto|the highest non-elected representative of the
central government in the territory|on police reports on the activities of the maa
in the municipality. The police evidence is produced in the course of investigations
on crimes often unrelated to the control of local public works. For instance, city
council dismissals are not prompted by indicators of administrative ineciency in the
procurement procedures. On the contrary, it is often the case that the procurement
procedures involving maa connections are closed quickly and at the low price, with
no apparent waste of public resources (Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta, 2005).
Through a systematic reading of the reports by the Commissione Parlamentare
d'Inchiesta to the Italian parliament, we have identied a four-way typology of police
investigation eventually leading to a city council dismissal: (a) investigation on crimes
by local administrators or politicians (not necessarily linked to their ocial functions);
(b) investigation on homicides and violent crimes in the course of wars among maa
organizations engaging in extortion and illegal trade in weapons and drugs, for the
control of the local territory; (c) investigation prompted by whistleblowers, providing
information on crimes typically unrelated to the inltration of public administration,
or (d) investigation prompted by the resignation of a major or council members from
the elected post, on possible maa pressure.
11Specically, instances representative of episodes leading to city council dismissals
range from the arrest of local administrators on charges of drug tracking (e.g., in
Roghudi, province of Reggio Calabria, and Cesa, province of Caserta), to the arrest of
the mayor and members of the city council on charges of theft, infringement of build-
ing laws and bid rigging (Sant'Andrea Apostolo dello Ionio, province of Catanzaro).
In a few cases, the arrest of the mayor is explicitly for association with the maa
(Gioia Tauro). City council dismissals follow from the investigation on deadly maa
ambushes in Lametia Terme and Guardavalle (province of Catanzaro), as well as on
threats against local administrators in Bordighera (Imperia). Direct and indirect links
between local administrators and the organized crime are uncovered after the resig-
nation of city council members and/or the mayor of Taurianova and San Ferdinando
(Reggio Calabria), Sant'Onofrio (Vibo Valentia) and Frattamaggiore (Napoli). In the
account of these crimes by the Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta, the elements
and circumstances leading to city council dismissal are often random|in particular,
it is hard to nd indication of a systematic link with variations in economic activity
at municipality level.16
To complement the narrative account above, we present statistical evidence on
growth patterns. Specically, we ask whether the local growth rates in the years
preceding a council dismissal are systematically above or below national averages.
In Table 3, we do so for all provinces with at least one council dismissal|focusing
only on the rst episode, so to insulate the results from possible lagged eects of
spending cuts during past compulsory administrations. As apparent from the table,
no systematic pattern emerges from the data.
A nal feature of dismissals worth stressing is that the time span from the emer-
gence of evidence of maa inltration, to the replacement of the city council by the
external commissioners is quite short|in our sample, it is often the case that the
whole process takes two months.17 Hence, conditional on the news that the dismissal
procedure has been set in motion, anticipations of government-mandated contrac-
tions in spending are unlikely to play a signicant role in our sample with yearly
observations|once the instrument is appropriately timed, as detailed below.
16We also note that the degree of enforcement of the law may be subject to some variation over
time|for instance, due to political or media pressure, or to changing priorities of the law enforcers,
or to the eort of judges and prosecutors. In our analysis, however, time variation is controlled by
calendar year dummies.
17While according to the Law the dismissal of the city council should normally follow a formal
decree by the President of the Republic, there are circumstances under which the local Prefetto can
proceed immediately, without waiting for the legal denition of the procedure. This has indeed been
common practice in the years after the new Law was introduced.
123.3 Implementation
To implement our IV strategy, we need to account for the fact that the dismissal of
a city council can occur at dierent times during a year: the yearly ow of invest-
ment spending, and in turn its possible eects on the year-to-year change in local
value added, will crucially depend on how close the dismissal is to the end of the
calendar year. To address this issue, we dene multiple instruments. A rst instru-
ment, dubbed \Council-dismissal-S1", equals the number of municipalities put under
compulsory administration, provided that the ocial decree is published in the rst
semester of the year. To dene our second instrument, \Council-dismissal-S2", we
calculate, for each case of compulsory administration, the number of days between
the dismissal of the city council and the year end, and average them over all munici-
palities in the same provinceyear. For every province, \Council-dismissal-S2" equals
the number of municipalities put under compulsory administration in any given year,
if the average number of days spent in such state is less than 180, and zero otherwise.
In our baseline model, we instrument Gi;t entering \Council-dismissal-S1" (S1)
contemporaneously and \Council-dismissal-S2" (S2) lagged one period. Thus, the
rst stage regression of our baseline specication is
Gi;t = i + t + 1S1i;t + 2S2i;t 1 + Xi;t + ei;t: (2)
We should stress that our results are not sensitive to alternative denitions of the
instrument|for instance, if we simply record, for each province, the number of mu-
nicipalities put under compulsory administration in the rst or the second semester of
the year (according to the date of publication of the ocial decree).18 In some of our
exercises, we will also use, as additional instruments or controls, two lags of the num-
ber of municipality put under compulsory administration for each provinceyear|a
variable simply dubbed \Council-dismissal".
In general, the results from the rst stage regressions (not reported) conrm the
point made with Table 2: provinces under compulsory administration tend to have a
lower average investment. The estimates of the coecients of both instruments are
always negative, as expected, and highly statistically signicant.
4 Empirical results
In this section, we discuss results from our regression model, starting from a minimalist
specication, then progressively enlarging the set of controls and instruments. We also
18Results are robust to instrumening public spending with the size of population across munici-
palities put under compulsory administrations.
13assess the inuence of individual provinces on our estimates and analyze cross-border
eects on the output of neighboring provinces.
4.1 Impact and dynamic multipliers
Our main results are shown in Table 4. The rst column of this table refers to a
minimalist specication of the model, not including lagged values of Y and G. The
one-year multiplier is statistically dierent from zero at standard condence levels,
with a point estimate of 1:17: an exogenous cut in public infrastructure expenditure at
local level of one percent of local value added determines a contemporaneous reduction
in output of 1:17 percent.
In the model in the second column, we deal with potential problems from serially
correlated errors by including two lags of the left-hand-side variable among the regres-
sors. With province- and year- xed eects in place, the impact of adding these lags
is negligible: there is hardly any change in the point estimate and the signicance of
. In the model in the third column, we add as further controls two lags of \Council-
dismissal" (at t 2 and t 3)|recording the total number of municipalities put under
compulsory administration by provinceyear. With the commissioners in charge for
a period of up to 18 months, in fact, an episode of compulsory administration can
run through three consecutive calendar years. The estimated coecient for  (and
its t-ratio) is now slightly higher relative to the specication in the rst column. But
the two lags of \Council-dismissal" are not statistically signicant|their inclusion as
regressors provides no evidence of a direct negative eect of council dismissals on fu-
ture value added. Note that, when testing the relevance of the instruments in the rst
stage regression, the value of the F-statistic is 10:48 for the specication in column
(3), suggesting that we are not incurring a weak instrument issue.
The presence of lags of the dependent variable among the regressors brings forward
dynamic eects of the multiplier. For the model on the third column of the table, in
which the rst lag of output growth is signicantly dierent from zero (although only
marginally so), the point estimate of the overall multiplier is 1:14 (the ratio between
the estimate of  and 1 minus the coecient on Y (t   1)).
In column (4) of Table 4, we make a dierent use of the variable \Council-
dismissal." Its lagged values at t 2 and t 3 are included not as additional controls,
but as additional instruments, thereby increasing the number of instruments from 2
to 4. The new specication has only a marginal eect on the point estimate and
the standard error of , relative to column (3). In principle, enlarging the set of
instruments should tend to increase the precision of estimates. Yet, in relatively
small samples the gain in precision might come at the cost of inducing some bias in
the point estimates, often towards the OLS result, if the instruments are weak (see
14Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Angrist and Pischke 2009). This is a potential con-
cern in our model of column (4), since the rst-stage F-statistic halves in size with
respect to the specication with 2 instruments.19
Further dynamic multiplier eects are explored in the last column of Table 4,
where we add two lags of public investment expenditure to our model specication
with two instruments|our preferred specication. Only the coecient of the rst lag
is statistically and economically signicant, with a point estimate which is about one
half that of the impact coecient. Note that adding lags of public spending raises our
estimate of the impact coecient  to 1:44. But since the estimate of the coecient
attached to the rst lag of value added growth is signicantly dierent from zero, and
equal to  0:16, the net multiplier eect of Gi;t is actually about 1:24, a value close
to the estimate recovered without lagged spending. This suggests that our model
disentangles the delayed eect of spending variations with some precision.
Under the assumption that lagged spending is predetermined to current output, we
can calculate an estimate of the overall multiplier by adding up the coecients relative
to the contemporaneous and the one-year lagged spending changes (appropriately
corrected for the impact of the rst lag of the dependent variable). The point estimate
of the overall multiplier is as high as 1:87.20 Nonetheless, we are not able to reject the
null hypothesis  6 1 in favor of  > 1 at the 5% percent condence level. In other
words, we cannot exclude the possibility that the contraction in public spending is
marginally oset by a simultaneous increase in private demand.21
Relative to a multiple-equation framework, a potential issue with single-equation
model like ours is that the estimated eects of government spending do not take into
account possible feedback from value added to spending: strictly speaking, our results
cannot be compared with results from SVAR models|a point stressed by Sims in
his comments on Angrist and Pischke (2010). In our sample, however, infrastructure
investment does not react to value added changes. Namely, in the rst-stage regression
relative to the model in column (5), the coecients of the two value added lags are
not statistically dierent from zero.22 In view of these results, the Sim's critique does
not appear to be a concern in our study: our single equation approach does not miss
out any feedback in accounting for short-run eects of public investment on output,
19In all the models in the table, the Anderson-Rubin test rejects the null hypothesis,  = 0, at the
5 percent level (with a p-value which is about 0:01). Moreover, the Hansen J statistics always imply
a p-value around 0:3, suggesting that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
20Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) uses biannual observations as a way to control for dynamics as
well as for lags between announcements and actual implementation of spending. Their estimated
multipliers, ranging between 1:4 and 1:9, are therefore quite comparable to, respectively, our impact
and dynamic estimates.
21The estimates of  and the overall multiplier are larger, and signicantly above one, if we use 4
instruments|however, again the F-statistic of the excluded instruments test falls.
22Point estimates for the rst and second lag are, respectively, 0:03 (with a t-ratio of 1:29) and
 0:01 (with a t-ratio of  0:42).
15relative to a VAR.
4.2 Inuence of individual provinces
The impact on the macroeconomic activity of a scal contraction, or even the size of
the spending cut, may dier across episodes of city council dismissals. It is possible
that some episodes exert a stronger inuence on our estimates, the same way in which
some particular episodes of scal expansions|e.g. the U.S. military build up during
the World War II|are recognized to be key in ascertain aggregate multiplier eects.
We address this issue by analyzing the extent to which our main evidence is sensitive
to the exclusion of any particular province from the analysis.
In Table 5, we report results for the most comprehensive specications of our
model with 2 instruments, excluding one of the following provinces in turn: Napoli,
Caserta, Palermo, Catania, Salerno, Bari, Reggio Calabria. As shown in Table 1,
these are the provinces with most episodes of city council dismissals. None of these
provinces is a crucial driver of our estimates. The sign and range of estimates of
coecients, as well as signicance levels, are comparable across columns and similar
to those reported previously for the overall sample. The point estimates of  are in
the range 1:26-1:50, while those of coecient of the lagged public spending ranges
from 0:67 to 0:77 (with the proportion between the two remaining roughly constant).
4.3 Cross-border eects
Variation in spending in one province might aect economic activity in neighboring
provinces (our data points automatically account for cross-border eects of spending
across municipalities in the same province). Cross-border eects of public spending,
if any, can nonetheless have a vastly dierent nature.
First, since our provinces are very open economies, part of the contraction in
demand in one municipality may \leak" into nearby areas, driving down economic
activity simultaneously within and outside the province where spending is cut. De-
mand spillovers induce a positive correlation in the response of value added of adjacent
provinces. In principle, an estimate of the total multiplier eect should include these
cross-border eects.
However, a positive correlation in the output response across provinces may also
correspond to cases in which the public work suspended by the commissioners extends
across provincial borders. In the presence of this second type of spillovers, including
cross-border eects would overstate the multiplier, since the regression model would
not account for the spending contraction in the adjacent provinces.
Finally, in response to a localized spending shock, it is possible that production
16factors relocate, moving across the boundaries of the province hit by the scal con-
traction. With this third type of spillovers, the fall in local economic activity in the
province under compulsory administration would correspond to an increase in eco-
nomic activity in the nearby areas, inducing a negative cross-border correlation of
value added. In the presence of relocation eects, estimates of local multipliers ig-
noring the creation of value added outside the area would be biased upwards. Note
that, whether positive or negative, the presence of spillovers would motivate some
aggregation of provinces into larger observation units.
We carry out an analysis of cross border eects of local spending in two ways.
First, we estimate cross-province eects within each region by extending the set of
regressors. Second, we aggregate observations by groups of 2/3 provinces at a time.
Results are shown in Table 6. Specically, in the rst column of the table, the
regression model also includes the variable SGi;t =
Sgi;t Sgi;t 1
Syi;t 1 and its rst lag|
where for each province i and year t, Sgi;t is the per-capita investment across provinces
which are part of the same region excluding province i itself, and the variable Syi;t 1
is accordingly dened. This rst exercise produces no evidence of spillovers: the
coecients of the newly dened variable and its lag are not signicantly dierent
from zero.
In the second column of Table 6, we enter SGi;t 1 interacted with Gi;t 1|both
measured in terms of deviation from the respective median value. This is to allow
for the possibility that the eect of local spending reects either complementarity
between spending in adjacent areas (e.g., work on a road crossing two provinces), or
substitutability (as an implication of a high spacial mobility of factors of production
in response to localized variation in spending). The coecient of the interaction term
is marginally signicant, with a positive sign|lending support to the hypothesis of
complementarity.23 Note that, with the inclusion of this interaction term to the set
of regressors, the point estimates of the coecients of contemporaneous and lagged
spending are only slightly aected.
The third column of the table reports results when we replace province-level obser-
vations with new ones, aggregating either two or three adjacent provinces in a single
unit. The coecients attached to Gi;t and Gi;t 1 increase a bit|providing evidence
that, if anything, the spillover eects end up adding to the local eect of spending.
23We have also estimated a model looking for a contemporaneous impact of the interaction term.
The coecient of this variable, however, was not statistically dierent from zero.
175 Do city council dismissals aect output indepen-
dently of variation in public spending?
For our IV estimation to be reliable, not only our instrument must have a clear eect
on Gi;t conditional on controls. It must also be uncorrelated with the error term in
the regression relating value added variations to public spending (it must satisfy the
\exclusion restriction"). In other words, we should be condent that the dismissal of
the city council matters for provincial output growth only to the extent that it causes
a (temporary but sharp) reduction in spending in infrastructure. The key question we
address in this section is whether council dismissals may be detrimental for economic
activity via other channels.
We start by observing that the most likely reasons why the exclusion restriction
may fail in the context of our study are linked to circumstances implying a systematic
negative relationship between our instrument and the average level of the dependent
variable at province level. Among the relevant instances, provinces characterized by
drops in public spending due to council dismissals may grow on average less than the
rest of the country, because of the maa. Specically, country level studies suggests a
negative relationship between corruption and growth. Via corruption, the historical
presence of maa in a province might have a negative eect on its long-run economic
growth, reected in low output growth rates over our sample years. Conversely, the
incidence of maa activities may be relatively high in slow-growing provinces, given
the lack of opportunities for lawful business. Finally, the risk of detection may be
correlated with the intensity of the maa activity. The inclusion of province xed-
eect, however, takes care of all these issues.
Nonetheless, there are at least two potential channels (not captured by province-
xed eect) worth discussing. The rst works through the direct impact on economic
activity of an increase in the intensity of police investigation, likely to be associated
with council dismissals; the second works through a general reduction in the output
of local bureaucracy because of the regime of compulsory administration. We discuss
these channels in turn.
Relocation/downsizing of maa activities. The exclusion restriction might fail
(despite province-xed eect) if legal action against a maa-controlled city govern-
ment ends up driving away, or otherwise reducing, the local activities of maa-related
business. The maa could indeed relocate/downsize some of its local business, in an-
ticipation that the area of the municipality be subject to intense police investigation
for some time.
In assessing this channel, it should be stressed that its implications for our IV
18estimates are to some extent ambiguous. A relocation of maa activities could have
no eect on value added at provincial level if, for instance, the mobsters simply sell
legal activities (such as retail shops) that continue to operate as before. A drop in
crimes and illegal activities, such as extortions, may instead have positive eects, to
the extent that it translates into a reduced \tax" on economic activities by rms and
households. Similarly, positive output eects may stem from deterrence of political
corruption during compulsory administrations.
In any case, as already explained, this channel is at least in part controlled for,
with the inclusion of ve variables proxying for the intensity of police activity in
our regression models. Moreover, indirect evidence at odds with it is produced in
the previous section, where we have shown that our model detects no evidence of
negative output spillovers across provinces, which could reect relocation of maa-
related business.
We should also emphasize that the information content of the \news" of a city
council dismissal is hardly about the extent of the maa activities in the local area, or
their prospective declines. Virtually all the council dismissals in our sample involve
cities where the presence of the maa and its ties to local administrators are public
knowledge. Moreover, even when the police investigation leads to arrests of mobsters
during the period of compulsory administration, it often produces but a small dent
in the network of illegal connections of organized crime. People hardly expect true
progress towards the eradication of the maa.
A shock to the output of the public sector. Independently of their eects on
public spending, it may be possible that city council dismissals per se are negative
shocks to the productivity of the public sector, if they interfere with the normal (by
local standards) functioning of the local administration. The sudden replacement of
elected ocials with external commissioners|the argument goes|may reduce the
administrative output of local ocers, with negative eects on economic activity.
By way of example, the number of business permits issued by the municipality may
substantially drop during the compulsory administration.
This criticism turns out to be weak on both institutional and empirical grounds.
On institutional ground, the 1991 Law envisions city council dismissals as a pro-active
initiative in the ght against the maa. Namely, as claried in the course of the debate
on the law, the commissioners are given the mandate to act as eciently as possible,
with the specic goal of showing to the population the social benets from freeing
local institutions from the maa.
\The compulsory administration in itself must be an opportunity for
improving the administration, improving politics, improving the relations
19between the government and the citizens" (De Rita 1995);24
\[...] the compulsory administration must not be a simple bridge to-
wards new elections, but an opportunity of development and growth for
the local institutions, as well as an opportunity for a new beginning for
the local community" (Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta, 2005).25
Based on an in-depth analysis of a sample of 19 municipalities (over the years
covered by our study), the report by the Ministro dell'Interno (2000) concludes that
the commissioners generally pursued their mandate scrupulously in this dimension.
Typically, the external commissioners made sure that administrative acts (such as
new hiring) de facto blocked or suspended because of distortions attributable to the
maa, were taken to completion|in areas spanning health, education, police, social
and public works. However, the ocial documents also recognize the limits of the
commissioners' action, pointing out that in most municipalities little fundamentally
changed by the end of compulsory administration. In other words, in the assessment
by the Commissione, the main shortcoming of the law is not a reduction in the out-
put by the local administration, but the absence of any signicant improvement in its
performance: the achievements by the commissioners were limited to guarantee ongo-
ing administrative activities (Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta, 2005). For our
purposes, this assessment relieves concerns about an administrative channel through
which the city council dismissals aect output independently of spending.
To shed further light on the issue, we also extend our empirical model, exploiting
the fact that in Italy city councils may be dismissed also for reasons dierent from
maa inltration, without necessarily implying a freezing of spending on public works.
If council dismissals are per se shocks to government, they should have a negative
eect on output even when they do not imply a contraction in spending.
For our extension, we have built a dataset including all the cases of city council
dismissals in Italy not related to the 1991 anti-maa law. Dismissals may occur
because of (a) resignation by elected ocials; (b) inability to organize elections of
part of the administration; (c) special cases of ineligibility of the mayor; (d) inability
to agree on the budget law; (e) political crisis in the ruling coalitions; and (f) other
reasons. As (a) and (b) are the most common cases, we use a single category for (a)
and (c), as well as for (d) and (e). We aggregate the municipality-level information
at provincial level, consistent with our dataset.26 Moreover, we also include the few
episodes of province council dismissals over the sample period.
24Our own translation.
25Our own translation.
26During the sample, the total number of city councils dismissed for reasons not related to maa
inltration was 2031. The most common case was resignation by elected ocials which accounts for
about one half of the total amount.
20First, we verify that the cases of council dismissals not related to maa inltration
are uncorrelated with a drop in public spending: in the rst-stage regression for our
augmented model, none of the new covariates are statistically signicant at the 5
percent level. We then test whether dismissals of a city council for reasons other
than maa inltration|hence not connected with a signicant variation in public
spending|have any signicant eect on output. As shown in Table 7, this is not the
case. The only category of dismissals with a signicant eect on output|the residual
category labelled \Others"|has actually a positive coecient.
To sum up, neither administrative documents, nor statistical analysis produce evi-
dence of a compulsory administration channel, supposedly aecting economic activity
through a drop in the performance of the local bureaucracy. The output eects of
a dismissal appears to materialize only when this is associated with a cut in public
spending.
6 Further results
In this section, we shed further light on the properties of our empirical model by
carrying out a number of exercises. Specically, we run the model restricting the
sample to Southern regions, with the goal of verifying the robustness of our result to
increasing the degree of homogeneity in economic structure across observations. We
then analyze the implications of dropping the year-xed eect (accounting for policies
and the business cycle at national level), or the province-specic eect (insulating our
results from dierences in cross-sectional averages unrelated to the multiplier). The
conclusion from these exercises conrms that our instrument disentangles exogenous
variations in public spending satisfactorily. Last but not least, we show the results
due to the OLS estimator.
North-South dierences. A potential concern with our empirical analysis is raised
by the fact that the episodes of compulsory administration related to maa inltra-
tion are mainly in the South, where economic conditions are dierent relative to the
rest of the country in many dimensions. Apart from a stronger presence of the maas,
especially relevant is the larger weight of government activities in local value added, as
well as dierences in the standards of performance of nancial intermediaries. While
province-xed eect and our additional controls already account for these dierences,
it is important to verify further whether North-South variability is crucial for our
results.
In Table 8, we restrict the sample to observations in the South (see column
\South"). Neither the coecient of Gi;t nor that of its rst lag change at all. The
21only relevant eect of dropping the North regards the coecient of the lagged value
added, whose point estimate is signicantly negative and large in absolute value, at
-0:29|thereby reducing somewhat our estimates of the overall multiplier, relative to
the whole sample.
Policy mix and business cycle at national level. As already mentioned, a key
problem in estimating public spending multipliers is that movements in government
purchases are likely to be endogenous with respect to GDP, and depend on the in-
teraction between monetary and scal policy, including budget policies governing the
adjustment of future taxes (and spending) to contemporaneous shocks. On the one
hand, if the model fails to control for the systematic pro- or anti-cyclical component of
spending, reverse causation translates into spurious estimates of the multiplier eects.
On the other hand, multiplier eects may reect a convolution of scal shocks, with
the eects of corresponding adjustment in the monetary stance and the budget. In
analyses based on local data, however, it is possible to control for policy and business
cycle at the national level, simply including the calendar-year dummies, capturing
common factors aecting all observations in any period of time.
The implications of dropping year dummies from our model are shown in the
column \Drop t". As expected, the impact multiplier rises somewhat|the point
estimate is as high as 1:78; the coecient capturing the delayed eect of spending is
instead unaected.
Cross-sectional dierences. Section 5 extensively discusses a number of reasons
why cross-sectional dierences across provinces may spuriously aect our estimates,
reecting institutional and economic factors, especially related to systematic policies
of fund allocations targeted to low-growing provinces, and/or systematic dierences
in the average growth rates across provinces with and without pervasive presence of
the maas. In light of this discussion, one may expect province-xed eect to play an
important role in our estimates.
When we remove the province xed eect, however, the multiplier does not change
in a relevant way (see column \Drop i" of Table 8). Our point estimate of  is 1:54
instead of 1:44; the coecient attached to lagged spending is virtually unchanged.
Comparison with OLS. In the last column of Table 8 we report OLS estimates.
Note that coecients of the contemporaneous and one-year lagged public spending
are both statistically signicant, but small in magnitude. In particular, the estimated
impact multiplier is 0:2, about seven times smaller than the corresponding IV esti-
mate in our baseline dynamic model|even larger dierences between OLS and IV
22estimates are nonetheless reported by Serrato and Wingender (2010) and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2011).
A low OLS estimate may in part reect a systematic policy of fund allocation to-
wards the provinces with low growth. However, most plausibly, it should be attributed
to anticipation eects, in view of the usually long lags between the announcement of
the fund allocation, and the implementation of local investment projects, which usu-
ally takes place over several years.
7 Theoretical insights on the transmission mecha-
nism
In the theoretical literature, output multipliers vary widely depending on structural
and policy features of the model economy. Yet, the literature does provide guid-
ance on the transmission mechanism underlying our ndings, especially when drawing
from contributions that study model economies with key features comparable to the
provinces in our sample. A relevant instance is provided by new Keynesian models of
small open economies that are part of a common currency area (or credibly pursue a
xed exchange rate). The main lessons from these models concern the role of mone-
tary and scal interactions|although this literature also emphasizes complementarity
between consumption and leisure in preferences, and nancial imperfections, in the
form of limited participation of households in the asset markets.
The key insight on the role of monetary and scal interactions is spelled out in
independent work by Corsetti et al. (2011) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011).
Regions or countries sharing a common currency area or, equivalently, in a credible
xed exchange rate system, face more than a common nominal interest rate. Because
purchasing power parity (henceforth PPP) must hold in the medium to the long run, a
common currency also pins down the dynamics of local prices and wages, and therefore
the dynamics of the real interest rates relevant to spending decisions by private agents.
In the short run, domestic prices falls in response to a contraction in public demand|
given nominal rates, this drives up short-term rates in real terms. Over time, however,
by PPP, prices are expected to rise back to their initial level|correspondingly, future
short-term real rates are expected to fall. These opposite movements in current and
anticipated future short-term real rates imply that, on impact, the response of the
long-term rates (arguably the relevant ones for private spending decisions) is actually
quite small. As a result, private demand is not crowded-in appreciably, and economic
activity initially tends to fall by the full extent of the unexpected scal contraction
falling on local goods.27
27With a common currency, long-run PPP relative to the price level outside the country/region hit
23In many a dimension, this open-economy result provides a natural benchmark for
assessing our ndings. Obviously, the provinces in our sample are akin to small open
economies facing an exogenously given policy rate in nominal terms. The transmission
mechanism via the price and real rate dynamics due to a common monetary policy
and PPP discussed above is likely to limit crowding-in by private sector, which would
otherwise oset the contractionary impact of public demand.
Nonetheless, there could be other channels amplifying, or muting, the transmission
of scal impulses. Several authors have recently emphasized nonseparability between
consumption and leisure in preferences|corresponding e.g. to GHH preferences (see
Greenwood Hercowitz and Human 1988). With these preferences, the fall in labor
eort and employment in response to a contraction in public demand would tend to
drive down private consumption demand, possibly causing the overall multiplier to
rise above one (for a discussion, see e.g. Bilbiie 2009, Hall 2009, Monacelli and Perotti
2008 and Nakamura and Steinsson 2011).28
Furthermore, a multiplier larger than one is predicted by versions of the baseline
model (with separable preferences), in which some fraction of the population does
not participate in the nancial markets. Namely, assuming that one third of the
households in each country are \hand-to-mouth consumers" (see Mankiw 2000), the
model of a small open economy credibly pegging its currency analyzed by Corsetti et
al. (2011) yields a value of the multiplier around 1:3 on impact. Given the charac-
teristics of the nancial sectors in Italy and especially in the Southern regions, where
most episodes of city council dismissals are concentrated, nancial imperfections are
most likely to play a role in the transmission of scal policy.29 It is worth stressing
that, in the new-Keynesian model, an unresponsive nominal interest rate is actually
crucial for the presence of hand-to-mouth consumers to be consequential as regards
the size of the multiplier. Without the constraint of common currency/exchange rate
peg, to the extent that the central bank responds to a slow down in ination due to
spending cuts by lowering the policy rate, the multiplier would be smaller, and lower
than one.30
by a shock is de facto equivalent to an implicit price level target | a target which in turn moderates
the transmission of negative shocks under a zero (or constant) nominal interest rate as analyzed by
e.g. Eggertsson and Woodford (2011). Corsetti et al. (2011) shows analytically that, in response to
temporary scal shocks, short- and long-term real interest rates move in opposite directions, and a
spending expansion has only a small crowding-out eect on current private spending, in proportion
to the impact change in prices | hence the multiplier is slightly below one. On the contrary, with an
independent currency and monetary policy, the multiplier can be above or below one, as a function
of the anti-inationary stance of the central bank and the budget policy.
28In their study of scal transmission in a currency union, Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) indeed
depart from the baseline new-Keynesian model outlined above, by stressing the importance of GHH
preferences, to rationalize their estimates of the multiplier larger than 1.
29Guiso et al. (1994) provide ample evidence that historically credit market imperfections in Italy
are pervasive, limiting households' ability to borrow. More recent evidence is provided by Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2006).
30With a common currency, the fact that nominal rates do not react to local cyclical conditions
24While this literature provides important insights on our results, and these in turn
appear to lend empirical support to the theoretical model, the contribution of our
experimental setting with local data is not limited to the debate on multiplier eects
in small open economies in a (credible) monetary union. Our estimates isolate the
spending component of the equilibrium transmission of scal policy, from the indirect
eect of tax adjustment, in addition to that of monetary policy. Recent theoretical
work suggests that prospective budget adjustment can have a substantial eect on
multipliers (see e.g. Romer and Romer 2010). Empirical analyses that fall short of
controlling for these policy interactions, or do so only partially, end up producing
estimates that average out dierent scal components with unknown weights.31 By
the same token, although our empirical model does not allow for asymmetric trans-
mission of spending expansions and cuts, our estimates of the multiplier mainly rely
on scal contractions. Also in this dimension, averaging out the eect of expansions
and contractions may overlook systematic dierences in the transmission channels
depending on the sign of the scal shock.
8 Conclusions
A crucial question raised by the global crisis concerns the conditions under which scal
stimulus can be expected to be most eective, or a contraction not too consequential,
for economic activity. Our study provides an empirical contribution to the research
agenda on this question. Based on a quasi experimental setting, we analyze the
eects of sharp spending contractions controlling for monetary and budget policies.
Our estimates suggest that, unless spending contractions can be compensated by
monetary expansions, and holding budget policy constant, their eects on output are
20 percent larger than the full amount of the spending cut accordingly to our IV
estimate; 80 percent larger overall, including the eect of lag spending.
An important dierence between our analysis and most of the literature on mul-
tipliers consists of the fact that our instrument identies large, unexpected scal
contractions. Especially with U.S. data, the variations in scal stance which are iden-
tied as exogenous to cyclical conditions typically consist of expansions in military
implies little or no crowding-in of private demand by agents who participate in the nancial markets.
If monetary policy reacts to spending cuts by lowering nominal rates, instead, the demand by these
agents rises.
31The challenge of estimating multipliers accounting more explicitly for budget and monetary
policy has been taken on by a new generation of contributions (see Corsetti et al. 2010, Corsetti
et al. 2012, Canova and Pappa 2011, Ilzetzki et al. 2010, Leeper et al. 2009 among others). This
literature has explored systematic dierences in the transmission of scal policy across exchange rate
regimes as a proxy for the monetary regimes, or jointly identied scal policy and the monetary
stance that accompanies it. Multipliers tend to be larger and/or signicantly above zero under a
xed exchange rate, or conditional on a given interest rate | in this respect, comparable with the
ndings of the literature using on local data and/or quasi-experiments surveyed in the introduction.
25spending. Episodes of sharp scal contractions usually do not qualify, since they
are typically undertaken in reaction to a deteriorating debt and decit outlook. As
a caveat, however, this feature of our study suggests caution in extrapolating our
results for assessing the eects of spending expansions.
As our units of observation, the Italian provinces, are small open economies sharing
a common currency, it is natural to draw on open macro theory to gain insights on
the scal transmission channels that most likely shape our results. The baseline new-
Keynesian model for these economies indeed suggests that the lack of a monetary
reaction to a scal contraction may prevent private demand from being crowded in
appreciably in response to the cuts|the impact multiplier tends to be at least as
large as one. In conjunction with the constraints that a common currency imposes on
interest rates in nominal and real terms, moreover, other factors may exacerbate the
eects of scal shocks. With nancial imperfections limiting the agents' participation
in nancial markets, for instance, the model predicts a spending multiplier well above
one. It is reasonable to expect these channels to be relevant in our study, especially
in light of the empirical evidence on the relatively poor performance of the nancial
markets and the banking sector in Italy over our sample years.
While leaving a thorough investigation of nancial imperfections as determinants
of scal transmission to future work, it is worth observing that, in most advanced
countries, nancial markets and intermediaries are still far from performing according
to normal standards, three years after the eruption of the global crisis in 2007. In
the light of this observation, our estimates can provide a meaningful input to the
current policy debate on scal consolidation, possibly requiring the implementation
of retrenchment measures in economies in nancial stress, not yet on a rm recovery
path and in which monetary policy has little room for expansion.
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A Data appendix
Public Spending. Public investment in infrastructure at province level. It in-
cludes spending on the following categories: Transport (roads and airports, railroads
and other kinds of transportation, ports and rivers, telecommunications); Sanitation-
Energy-Reclamation (hospitals, electric and hydroelectric plants, swamps, land recla-
mation, other categories); Buildings (public buildings and schools; public spending
devoted to private buildings). Data are at current prices. Source: ISTAT, Annuario
delle Opere Pubbliche, (various issues). From 1986 to1999 ISTAT collected quarterly
data on infrastructure investment at municipality level through the network of local
statistical oces. The data were then aggregated at province level at yearly frequency.
Since not all municipalities were included in the data collection, for each year and
province ISTAT provides an index Mit useful to convert the sample data into the
eective level of provincial investment. In particular, let e xit denote the level of in-
vestment for province i at time t aggregating information from the municipalities in
the sample. Given the index Mit, the estimated overall public investment at provin-
cial level is xit = e xit=Mit: We deate the public spending using the national GDP
deator for Italy.
Value added. Total value added at province level measured in millions of euro at
current prices. Sources: Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne and ISTAT. We deate the
province value added using the national GDP deator for Italy.
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni. \Cassa integazione guadagni" is the main unem-
ployment benet arrangement covering employees of private rms in Italy. Source:
Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne.
Population. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche Demograche (various issues).
Employment. Sources: Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne and ISTAT
Compulsory administration. Municipalities placed under the administration of
external commissioners by the central government on evidence of ties between admin-
30istrators and the maas, either through the direct inltration of mobsters among local
bureaucrats or politicians or through indirect inuence. Source: Commissione par-
lamentare d'inchiesta sul fenomeno della criminalit a organizzata maosa o similare.
Technical Report (various issues).
Maa-type association. People reported by the police forces to the judicial au-
thority because of maa association (art. 416-bis of the Italian penal code). Source:
ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various issues).
Extortion. People reported by the police forces to the judicial authority because of
extortion. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various issues).
Murder. People reported by the police forces to the judicial authority because of
murders related to the activity of maa associations. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche
giudiziarie (various issues).
Corruption. Crimes and people prosecuted relative to a broad measure of corrup-
tion, including embezzlement, misappropriation of yield to the damage of government,
extortion and bribery agreements. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various is-
sues).
Table 1: Municipalities under compulsory administration because of maa inltration
(by province and region)
Napoli 44 Palermo 23 Reggio C. 23 Bari 5
Caserta 22 Catania 9 Catanzaro 7 Lecce 2
Salerno 5 Trapani 5 Vibo V. 5
Avellino 3 Caltanisetta 5 Crotone 3
Benevento 1 Agrigento 4
Messina 2
Ragusa 1
Campania 75 Sicily 49 Calabria 38 Puglia 7
Note: The table reports the number of municipalities put under the administration of
external commissioners because of relationships between elected administrators and
the maas. Time period 1991-2008.
31Table 2: Investment Spending, Mean Dierence Test
Log-dierence Log-dierence Percent of Value added Percent of Value added
Dierence -0.220 -0.228 -0.555 -0.650
[-3.63] [-3.21] [-2.61] [-2.45]
Control group 0.0584 0.0666 0.120 0.215
[4.70] [1.72] [3.10] [1.32]
N 950 180 950 180
Note: The table shows the results of mean dierence tests relative to changes in public infrastructure investment.
The treatment group consists of the year-province observations in which at least a municipality in the province
is put under compulsory administration; the control group includes the rest of the sample. In the second and
fourth columns, the sample is restricted only to provinces characterized by at least one case of local government
dismissal during the sample period. "Dierence" reports a measure of variations in investment driven by compulsory
administrations, that is, the mean dierence test by comparing investment variations across the two groups. Data
are annual from 1990 to 1999 at Italian province level. The t-statistic is reported in brackets: *p < 0:05, **p < 0:01,
*** p < 0:001
Table 3: Randomness of Council Dismissals
> 0 < 0 > 0 or < 0
t   1 & t   2 1=3 1=6 1=2
t   1 & t   2 & t   3 1=9 0 8=9
Note: The table reports the proportion of provinces with council dis-
missals, for which growth rates are always above the national average
(column labeled with > 0), always below the national average (column
labeled with < 0), without a constant sign (last column), over the two-
and the three-year period before the occurrence of dismissals.
32Table 4: Investment Spending Multiplier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
G(t) 1.17* 1.21* 1.29* 1.31* 1.44**
[2.11] [2.30] [2.55] [2.54] [2.67]
Y(t-1) -0.12 -0.13* -0.12 -0.16**
[-1.92] [-1.97] [-1.92] [-2.62]
Y(t-2) -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02









Time eects YES YES YES YES YES
Provincial xed eects YES YES YES YES YES
Controls for maa investigation YES YES YES YES YES
Unemployment rate proxies YES YES YES YES YES
Number of instruments 2 2 2 4 2
Excluded instruments F-
statistic
9.20 9.78 10.48 6.35 9.84
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 950 950 950 950 950
Note: Data are annual from 1990 to 1999 at Italian province level. The dependent variable is the
year-on-year change in per capita real Value Added divided by the previous year's per capita real
Value Added. G(t) is the dated t year-on-year change in per capita real infrastructure investment
(nominal spending divided by the GDP deator) divided by the previous year's per capita real Value
Added. G(t-1) and G(t-2) are the lagged values of G. Council-dismissal(t-2) and Council-dismissal(t-
3) are the lagged values of number of municipalities put under compulsory administration for a given
province at t. All estimated equations contain on the right-hand side year dummies, the rst two lags
of employment and the hours of \cassa integrazione" (both entered as per-capita log-dierence), and
a set of ve crime-related variables|the number of people reported to the judicial authority because
of (i) organized crime, (ii) extortion, and (iii) maa murders; the number of (iv) crimes and (v) people
prosecuted relative to corruption (all specied in log-dierence, and in per capita terms, up to two
lags). Estimation is by two-stage least-squares using Council-dismissal-S1 and Council-dismissal-S2
as instruments. In column (4) we enlarge the set of instruments with Council-dismissal(t-2) and
Council-dismissal(t-3). Standard errors clustered at the region level. The t-statistic is reported in
squared brackets: *p < 0:05, **p < 0:01
33Table 5: Dropping provinces
NA CE PA CT SA BA RC
G(t) 1.50** 1.26* 1.40* 1.27* 1.40* 1.43** 1.28**
[2.61] [2.51] [2.53] [2.14] [2.53] [2.70] [2.60]
Y(t-1) -0.16** -0.16** -0.16* -0.16** -0.16* -0.16** -0.13*
[-2.60] [-2.75] [-2.56] [-2.67] [-2.55] [-2.58] [-2.13]
Y(t-2) -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
[-0.22] [-0.36] [-0.28] [-0.39] [-0.31] [-0.20] [-0.77]
Council-dismissal(t-2) -0.11 -0.27 -0.16 -0.12 -0.17 -0.17 -0.31
[-0.37] [-1.38] [-0.74] [-0.62] [-0.81] [-0.78] [-1.88]
Council-dismissal(t-3) -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04
[-0.38] [-0.59] [-0.29] [-0.13] [-0.58] [-0.33] [-0.27]
G(t-1) 0.77** 0.67** 0.73** 0.67* 0.73** 0.74** 0.68**
[2.84] [2.81] [2.92] [2.45] [2.82] [2.95] [2.97]
G(t-2) 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.16
[1.65] [1.45] [1.62] [1.42] [1.65] [1.63] [1.54]
Time eects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Provincial xed eects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls maa YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Unemp. proxies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of instruments 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Excluded instruments
F-statistic
10.94 14.21 8.01 8.94 7.91 9.78 7.97
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 940 940 940 940 940 940 940
Note: Each column reports estimates the headline province only: NA: Naples; CE: Caserta; PA: Palermo;
CT: Catania; SA: Salerno; BA: Bari; RC: Reggio Calabria
34Table 6: Spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
G(t) 1.38* 1.35** 1.58**
[2.25] [2.59] [3.07]
Y(t-1) -0.17** -0.16** -0.19**
[-2.75] [-2.71] [-2.95]
Y(t-2) -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
[-0.24] [-0.22] [-0.08]
Council-dismissal(t-2) -0.19 -0.20 -0.15
[-0.97] [-1.03] [-0.91]
Council-dismissal(t-3) -0.07 -0.07 -0.14
[-0.43] [-0.43] [-1.11]
G(t-1) 0.70* 0.68** 0.88**
[2.50] [2.94] [3.29]








Time eects YES YES YES
Provincial xed eects YES YES YES
Controls for maa investigation YES YES YES
Unemployment rate proxies YES YES YES




(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 950 950 410
Note: For each province i, the variable SG denotes public spending variations in the provinces which
are part of the same region as i, excluding province i itself. In the second column, we enter SGi;t 1
interacted with Gi;t 1, both measured in deviation from the median value. In the third column we
show results where our original observations are replaced by new ones, aggregating either two or
three adjacent provinces in a single area.
35Table 7: Do city council dismissals aect output independently of variation in public
spending?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
G(t) 1.43** 1.46** 1.44** 1.63** 1.46**
[2.63] [2.62] [2.70] [2.61] [2.70]
Y(t-1) -0.16** -0.16** -0.16** -0.17** -0.16**
[-2.62] [-2.61] [-2.63] [-2.63] [-2.64]
Y(t-2) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
[-0.29] [-0.27] [-0.29] [-0.20] [-0.25]
Council-dismissal(t-2) -0.19 -0.18 -0.19 -0.17 -0.19
[-0.97] [-0.89] [-0.95] [-0.81] [-0.96]
Council-dismissal(t-3) -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06
[-0.44] [-0.42] [-0.46] [-0.42] [-0.38]
G(t-1) 0.74** 0.75** 0.74** 0.82** 0.75**
[2.91] [2.87] [2.95] [2.81] [2.95]
G(t-2) 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19









Budget-No condence vote(t) 0.04
[0.29]










Time eects YES YES YES YES YES
Provincial xed eects YES YES YES YES YES
Controls for maa investigation YES YES YES YES YES
Unemployment rate proxies YES YES YES YES YES
Number of instruments 2 2 2 2 2
Excluded instruments F-statistic 10.82 9.39 9.76 10.48 9.76
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 950 950 950 950 950
Note: The table shows results from adding to the baseline specication variables capturing
council dismissals for reasons unrelated to maa inltration. Dismissals may occur because
of resignation by elected ocials and special cases of ineligibility of the mayor; inability to
organize elections of part of the administration; inability to agree on the budget law and
political crisis in the ruling coalitions; others. Columns (1)-(4) refer to cases of city council
dismissals, while in column (5) we consider province council dismissals.
36Table 8: Further results
South Drop t Drop i OLS
G(t) 1.45** 1.78** 1.54** 0.20**
[2.69] [3.16] [2.84] [3.16]
Y(t-1) -0.29** -0.11 -0.07 -0.12*
[-3.03] [-1.81] [-1.05] [-2.15]
Y(t-2) -0.00 0.06 0.06 -0.03
[-0.03] [0.97] [1.01] [-0.55]
Council-dismissal(t-2) -0.21 -0.09 -0.20 -0.28
[-1.07] [-0.47] [-1.03] [-1.84]
Council-dismissal(t-3) -0.02 0.06 -0.07 -0.14
[-0.14] [0.27] [-0.45] [-0.99]
G(t-1) 0.76** 0.75* 0.71** 0.23***
[2.99] [2.49] [2.90] [3.31]
G(t-2) 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.03
[1.23] [1.03] [1.24] [0.47]
Time eects YES NO YES YES
Provincial xed eects YES YES NO YES
Controls for maa investigation YES YES YES YES
Unemployment rate proxies YES YES YES YES




(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 340 950 950 950
Note: In the rst column we restrict the sample to the South of Italy. In the
second and third columns we drop, respectively, time and province dummies.
In the nal column we report OLS estimates.
37Figure 1: Public Spending Changes.
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